Rehabilitation, delay and the criminal court’s discretion

In some cases, where there has been a lengthy delay between offending and sentence, the court may recognise the detrimental impact of that delay on the defendant. Such a delay may be treated as a mitigating feature and may result in a reduction in sentence, particularly where there is evidence of rehabilitation. 

The Court of Appeal recently considered the issue in Wilson. The offender was convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour. The complainant first made a statement in June 2019, but proceedings were not instituted until August 2024. The trial took place in September 2025, over six years after the end of the relevant conduct. The Court noted that no explanation could be put forward to justify the delay. 

The offender received 18 months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months, with unpaid work and rehabilitation activity requirements. The Solicitor General referred the sentence as unduly lenient. Although the Court granted leave, it ultimately declined to interfere. 

The decision needs to be read alongside R v Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453. In that case, the Court observed that where delay before charge is not attributable to the offender, some reduction may follow, but that such a reduction would be “most unlikely to be as great as 25%”, particularly where the offences were serious. On the facts of Timpson, there was no proper basis for any reduction for delay. 

In R v Barrett [2025] EWCA Crim 840, the Court considered the Sentencing Council guidance on delay. It explained that the type of detrimental effect normally envisaged is where an offender suffers genuine psychological or physical harm because of the delay, or where the offender has effectively had to put his life on hold while awaiting a decision on prosecution. 

Wilson is noteworthy because the Court accepted that the offender had not suffered that conventional form of detriment. He had not suffered harm caused by the delay and had not put his life on hold. Instead, the Court found that the delay had a “different but equally material effect”: it had enabled him to turn his life around. The Court referred to the absence of further relevant offending, his efforts to obtain help for anger-related issues, and evidence of a successful long-term relationship. The Court regarded those consequences of the delay as providing significant mitigation. 

The authorities do not suggest that delay will automatically result in a lower sentence. Timpson and Barrett both demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s willingness to scrutinise carefully any reduction said to arise from delay. Wilson itself should not be treated as setting a precedent, and the outcome will depend on the facts of the individual case.