Short prison sentences: when “serious” is not “exceptional”

The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Morgan (Corey) [2026] EWCA Crim 886 is a striking early example of the new statutory presumption that custodial sentences of 12 months or less should usually be suspended.

The facts were serious. The appellant chased another vehicle through residential streets after an argument with his partner. The other vehicle was driven by a pregnant woman. Her young child and the appellant’s partner were passengers. During the chase he struck a parked car, rammed the other vehicle three times at significant speed, and eventually crashed into a tree, overturning his car causing him very serious injuries.

There were further aggravating features. He was uninsured, had never passed a driving test, and later blood analysis showed alcohol above the legal limit, together with cocaine and cannabis metabolites. The sentencing judge imposed an immediate sentence of eight months’ imprisonment for dangerous driving.

The issue was that he had been sentenced after section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 had come into force. That provision applies where an offender is convicted on or after 22 March 2026, the term is 12 months or less, and a suspended sentence order is available.

In such circumstances, the court must suspend the sentence unless it finds exceptional circumstances, relating to the offence or the offender, which justify immediate custody. None of the statutory exemptions applied. The sentencing judge had not been referred to section 277A and had made no finding of exceptional circumstances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and the eight-month immediate custodial sentence was suspended for two years.

Serious is not necessarily exceptional

Lord Justice Edis made clear that seriousness alone is unlikely to be enough. In every case where section 277A applies, the court below had already decided that the appropriate custodial term was 12 months. The seriousness of the offending was therefore already reflected in the length of sentence.

The Court declined to define every case that might be exceptional but emphasised the strength of the word chosen by Parliament. Circumstances commonly encountered, even in serious cases, will not necessarily be enough. It observed that there was, regrettably, nothing exceptional about uncontrolled aggression on the streets by a man who had become angry with his partner.

This is what makes the decision noteworthy. The facts were frightening and likely to attract public concern. The Court said that before the 2026 Act it would not have interfered with the immediate sentence. But the statutory landscape had changed: Parliament’s intention was that short prison sentences should almost always be suspended.

Why this matters

Morgan is likely to be important for advocates, sentencers and anyone advising defendants where custody of 12 months or less is a realistic outcome. If the presumption applies, the question is not simply whether the offence is serious enough for immediate custody. The court must identify exceptional circumstances if it is to impose a short immediate sentence.