Recent BBC reporting has highlighted serious safeguarding concerns arising from the use of the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) Update Service in recruitment decisions. The case involved a nursery worker in Leeds who, despite being arrested for serious child protection offences and later imprisoned, was able to obtain further employment in a childcare setting while on bail.
The incident has prompted an urgent government review of the DBS system and renewed scrutiny from regulators, employers and safeguarding professionals. For employers in education and early years settings, the case is a stark reminder that safer recruitment must be rigorous, multi-layered and risk-based.
A central issue exposed by the case is the limitation of the DBS Update Service. While widely used, it does not provide real-time safeguarding intelligence. The service may only refresh certain non-conviction information, such as arrests, periodically rather than immediately, which can create significant delays in reflecting emerging risks. The Leeds nursery case reports indicated that the individual’s arrest had not been reflected in checks available to the employer at the time, allowing continued access to children.
The Update Service should therefore be treated as one element of the vetting process, not a definitive or standalone confirmation of suitability.
Employers should review whether their current reliance on existing DBS certificates and Update Service checks is sufficient. A fresh enhanced DBS check should be obtained where there has been a gap in service, a change in role, or where the role presents heightened safeguarding risk. Reliance on a previous certificate and “no change” status alone is unlikely to be defensible in higher-risk environments. DBS certificates represent only a snapshot in time rather than an ongoing assurance of suitability.
In settings involving particularly vulnerable groups, such as early years provision or roles with unsupervised access to children, a more cautious approach will often be justified as part of an employer’s safeguarding duty.
The case also highlighted the risk of falsified references, reinforcing the importance of a robust and triangulated referencing process. Employers should verify references directly with referees using independently sourced contact details, rather than relying solely on those provided by the candidate. References should be carefully scrutinised for inconsistencies, unexplained gaps, or any reluctance to comment on safeguarding suitability. References should be treated as a key safeguarding control rather than a routine administrative step.
The principles set out in Keeping Children Safe in Education remain highly relevant, even beyond schools. Employers should ensure that a full employment history is obtained and reviewed, with any gaps clearly explained and tested at interview. Any ambiguity, particularly in recent employment, should be treated as a potential safeguarding concern rather than simply an administrative issue. References should come from a senior person with appropriate authority, within the organisation of the most recent employer.
It is also prudent to require shortlisted candidates to make a positive declaration about their criminal history, including any ongoing investigations, arrests or bail conditions as part of the recruitment process. While this relies on honesty, it supports a culture of transparency and strengthens the employer’s position if concerns later arise, particularly where there has been a failure to disclose relevant information. Further, institutions should include a statement in application forms or information packs provided to applicants making it clear that it is an offence to apply for certain roles if the applicant is barred from engaging in regulated activity relevant to children.
Crucially, safeguarding does not end at recruitment. Employers should have clear processes for maintaining ongoing assurance of staff suitability. This includes adopting a risk-based approach to periodic DBS re-checks and ensuring there are clear expectations that staff must report any arrests, charges or investigations without delay. Contractual clauses requiring immediate self-reporting of relevant matters can provide additional protection and clarity.
The broader lesson from this case is that safeguarding failures are rarely the result of a single issue. Rather, they tend to arise from a combination of weaknesses across recruitment, vetting and ongoing monitoring processes. While DBS checks remain an essential component, they cannot be treated as a complete safeguard in isolation. As the case demonstrates, individuals may present with a clear DBS status while still posing a risk due to recent or undisclosed events.
Education and childcare employers should take this opportunity to review their safer recruitment and safeguarding practices to ensure they are robust, proportionate and aligned with current risks.

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